This paper considers the incentives faced by investors (financial institutions) to become actively involved in the direction of their under-performing portfolio companies as proposed by recent policy reports on corporate governance. It proposes a metric by which to measure the returns to activism in terms of the size of holding, measures of risk and return to the company, the degree of under performance and the level of commission received by fiduciary fund managers. By comparing this with costs of activism it proposes a method by which 'significant shareholdings' may be estimated. A significant shareholding is the level above which a shareholding in a company may be said to have private incentives to activism. This approach is applied to two groups of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, the top 250 and a ten percent random sample. The results indicate that there are very strong incentives for shareholders to be activist participants in corporate governance among the top 250 companies while there is much more diversity among the smaller companies. Results differ considerably between those where the shareholder is an own-account investor and a fund manager.
Introduction
Much recent discussion of policies aimed at improving standards of corporate governance has increasingly focused on the role of shareholders: as the legal owners of a company they can be said to have the ultimate responsibility for all aspects of its conduct and performance and are the group to whom management is accountable. This is a significant change from the more traditional view in which investors do not become involved in the direction of the company -simply buying or selling its shares according to whether it does well or badly -and relying on the market for corporate control to enforce standards of performance through takeovers or threat of takeovers. As a form of market regulation this has been shown to be inadequate and there are strong arguments for the new approach through corporate governance activism. At the same time, and on the other hand, there is considerable evidence that investors have yet fully to embrace their new responsibilities and discharge their associated duties.
Shareholder activism 1 derives from investors developing long term relationships with the companies in which they invest. Rather than their involvement being little more than that of anonymous speculators, trading their shares on the market, they become the owners with an interest in the company's progress, a knowledge of its business and personnel and a commitment to its long term success; at the same time they have the capacity to influence the direction of the company through the voting rights that the shares carry.
The need for this changed relationship has come about because of the increased dominance of financial institutions as shareholders. The majority of shares on the London Stock Exchange are now held by British financial institutions: 51.9 percent in 1999 (ONS 1999) . The growth in the size of pension funds and insurance companies means that increasingly institutional portfolios contain shares in a very large number of companies, if not every one listed on the market. At the same time relatively fewer shares are now held by individuals than in the past. This significantly restricts the opportunity for selling poorly performing shares without causing a substantial share price fall, and therefore limits the effectiveness of the market for corporate control as a discipline.
An activist shareholder is involved with the company at the highest level. It 2 needs
to be informed about the company in order properly to be able to exercise its voting rights.
It needs to engage in dialogue with the board of directors to understand its strategy and monitor its performance, especially when things are not going well, when it must take a view on the optimal action and if necessary intervene. An activist investor will invest in a poorly performing company where it sees there is the potential for improvement after suitable changes have been made in its strategy or board membership. It needs to meet with the directors and management and use its influence on behalf of the owners to raise standards of performance. This does not mean confrontation -a consensus is better -but the relationship is one where the owner has power over the directors based on the ultimate sanction that changes in board membership might be brought about by a vote at the annual general meeting.
It is often argued that shareholders cannot be expected to discharge the duties of ownership because they lack the necessary financial incentives. This argument against shareholder activism arises where there is a liquid equity market like in Britain and the United States so that typically ownership stakes in companies are relatively small in percentage terms. While it might be true that the holder of a very large block of shares (usually taken as above 20 percent of the company's voting shares) has indeed a sufficient incentive to play the role of active owner -to monitor the company's performance, participate in decision making and to exercise the voting rights attached to the sharesnevertheless such large shareowners are few. Typically a company's largest shareholders each controls only a few percent of the equity, small both in terms of cash-flow rights and voting power, and are therefore seen as lacking the necessary private incentives: any benefit they may expect to gain as a result of intervening with management to secure an improvement in company performance is likely to be less than the cost of doing so.
Moreover a shareholder in command of only a small fraction of the votes is not in a very powerful position from which to challenge directors by voting against board recommendations at a company meeting.
This paper examines this question by considering the private incentives faced by investors. It argues, in contrast to much of the theoretical literature, that the free-rider argument is frequently overstated and that very many shareholders, in fact, can be said to face the appropriate incentives attaching to their cash-flow rights. A typical shareholding held by an investor in a large company, although relatively small in percentage terms -the largest shareholder in a top-250 company not infrequently controls no more than 2 or 3 percent -nevertheless is very large in absolute terms. Thus the expected private returns to such a holding from an improvement in company performance are likely to be considerable. By contrast the likely costs that must be incurred in order to participate are of a different order, being related to such activities as research, analysis, attending meetings and voting. The issue of investor incentives to activism is a real one but it is empirical in that some investors will have strong incentives while most undoubtedly lack them. This paper proposes an approach to this question based on a metric by which the returns to activism may be quantified. One of the main results I find is that it can be said that many leading investors in large companies have very large private incentives.
The approach adopted is a theoretical analysis applied to information on share ownership of real companies on the London Stock Exchange. The focus is on the question of whether the private incentives facing shareholders are such that it will pay them to behave socially responsibly by being actively discharging the responsibilities of ownership. For a shareholder being an activist means not only becoming informed about company performance and alternatives, becoming in a position to know what changes are needed to rectify weak performance; there is also the question of whether it has enough votes to be able to carry them out. I ignore this problem in this paper by maintaining the reasonable fiction that the required changes will always be implemented. This is a reasonable assumption because there is also an incentive to share its information with the other shareholders in order to inform a vote which would bring this about. Competing shareholders have interests in the outcome of such a vote in common.
The usual arguments against activism are considered before presenting the model and results for the UK. These typically run together a number of related issues that are better separated. I treat the free rider arguments separately from those involving conflicts of interest, since they are of fundamentally different orders.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 1 the free-rider argument is examined as a public goods problem but I show that the key issue here is whether there are private incentives to supply a public good; in the case where there are, the question becomes fundamentally different from that normally considered in the literature. Section 2 presents a conventional discussion of conflicts of interest that inhibit investors, and argues the need for rules to remove these. The model is presented in section 3; this assumes a shareholder activist is also a passive portfolio investor: shares are held long term in the portfolio subject to the normal random fluctuations in returns, which are screened every year. Severe underperformance is taken as indicating a substantial problem with the management of the company and therefore likely returns to intervention. This is the basis of a measure of the expected returns to activism which can be compared with the associated costs. This model makes it possible to estimate the size of investment that would be large enough to carry private cash flow incentives to activism. This is applied to two groups of British companies in section 4, separate analyses for the Top 250 largest companies and a Random Sample taken from the whole market. I present results showing that there are in fact very strong incentives to corporate governance activism on shareholders of the largest companies but much more mixed for the market as a whole. Section 5 is the conclusion and discussion.
Obstacles to Activism: the Free Rider Argument
Advocates of greater shareholder involvement in the direction of their portfolio companies when they perform badly have argued, implicitly or explicitly, that such intervention is not only in the public interest but also in the investors' own best interests.
The Cadbury Report, for example, described the voting rights attaching to ordinary shares as a valuable asset: "Given the weight of their votes, the way in which institutional shareholders use their power to influence the standards of corporate governance is of fundamental importance. Their readiness to do this turns on the degree to which they see it as their responsibility as owners, and in the interest of those whose money they are investing, to bring about changes in companies when necessary, rather than selling their shares … Voting rights can be regarded as an asset, and the use or otherwise of those rights by institutional shareholders is a subject of legitimate interest to those on whose behalf they invest." (Cadbury, 1992) This statement can be read as a plea to shareholders to use their votes collectively, as a service to the public, and slightly leaves open the question of private incentives for individual institutional shareholders.
The Myners Report, however, is explicit in suggesting that shareholder intervention in failing companies is in their own interests: "In managing pension funds' assets, fund managers have also pursued only a limited range of strategies to deliver value to clients. In particular, the review found evidence of general reluctance to tackle corporate underperformance in investee companies, particularly pre-emptive action to prevent troubled companies developing serious problems. … The review was given a number of reasons for this, none of which it believes to be compelling …. If fund managers are truly to fulfil their duty of seeking to maximise value for their shareholders, then there will be times -certainly more than at present -when intervention is the right action to take. Against this is the argument that shareholders typically lack suitable incentives to activism because that would, in effect, mean supplying what is a public good to the community of all shareholders. The following passage is typical of many: "Most public companies are held by many shareholders owning only small stakes … an active shareholder cannot capture all of the gain from becoming involved, studying the enterprise, or sitting on the board of directors, thereby taking the risks of enhanced liability. Such a shareholder would incur the costs but split the gains, causing most fragmented shareholders to rationally forgo involvement. In the language of modern economics, we have a collective action problem among shareholders -despite the potential gains to shareholders as a group, it's rational for each stockholder when acting alone to do nothing, because each would get only a fraction of the gain, which accrues to the firm and to all of the stockholders. This shareholder collective action problem is then layered on top of a principal-agent problem -agents, in this case the managers, sometimes don't do the principal's, in this case the stockholder's, bidding." (Roe, 1994) .
This argument relies on the fact that the activist shareholder receives only a small fraction of the gain resulting from its actions. But this is surely irrelevant and what actually matters as a basis for action is only whether the benefit exceeds the costs. An investor with a 1 percent holding, for example, might be substantially better off by being active than not, even though 99 percent of the gains thereby generated benefit other shareholders; all that is required for there to be an appropriate incentive is that the private benefit exceeds the cost of supplying it.
There will always be a form of shareholder collective action problem but it is necessary to make a distinction between two different situations. The first case is where all shareholders have such small stakes that the benefits they might receive from activism never exceed the associated costs. This is the case described above, in the quotation from Roe, and which appears widely in the literature; this case gives rise to the 'rational abstention' of Downs (1957) , and the 'logic of collective action' problem of Olsen (1963) .
The coordination problem is decisive in this case and 'free riding' behaviour by all shareholders is rational. This situation is one where there is poor corporate governance.
The second case however is where the stakes of some shareholders are sufficiently large that the private benefits they can expect to receive as a result of successful intervention outweigh the costs they incur. This case is fundamentally different from the previous one because now the system of corporate governance can be based on companies being held accountable by active shareholders with the right incentives; now the shareholders are economic actors with private incentives to supply a public good.
There still remains, in this case, however, a co-ordination problem because there is still an incentive to free ride. But a complete coordination failure, caused by all shareholders behaving in this way, that would result in the good not being supplied, would be irrational and pathological (its formal structure is that of a game of 'chicken' in game theory). An activist shareholder who is able to show how to improve the company's performance is better off whatever the actions of others. If others free ride by doing nothing in the knowledge that the public good will be supplied, then, ceteris paribus, the free riders will do better in relative terms. But that is irrelevant to an investor unless the investors are competing according to some common benchmark. It will be a problem in such cases, for example where they are fund management companies competing for business on the basis of relative performance. But the problem there is rather in the nature of a conflict of interests and will be discussed in the next section. If the shareholder is acting on its own-account, as for example a pension fund which is managed in-house by its trustees, or a personal shareholding held by an individual then what matters is the return to the fund, not comparative performance of different fund managers.
The question of the dividing line between the first and second of these situations is essentially empirical. It is the thesis of this paper that the second case does not give an empty group: that there are many shareholdings that can be shown to possess individual incentives to corporate governance activism. I will refer to them as "significant shareholdings".
I do not consider voting power in this paper. In previous work I have investigated the relationship between the degree of dispersion of the share ownership and the voting power represented by the combined votes of a group of shareholders acting together. (Leech, 1987 , Leech and Leahy, 1991 A robust result to have emerged from this work is that in almost all companies of whatever size the top seven shareholdings combined, if they voted together as a bloc, would have enough voting power for effective control (Leech, 2001) . Therefore I make the simplifying assumption that there is no voting problem because an activist shareholder is always able to bring pressure to bear by having, as the ultimate sanction over recalcitrant management, the capacity to win votes to change the directors at company annual meetings. If an individual "significant" shareholder, as part of its activism to improve company performance, is in a position to make proposals for changes in strategy or board membership that would improve results then it also has an incentive to make its information freely available to its rivals in order to induce them to support it in a vote. They have a common interest and therefore the question of voting here is secondary to that of incentives. This is an unrealistic assumption to make in practice because there are many obstacles to coordinated shareholder action, detailed in the next section.
Obstacles to Activism: Conflicts of Interest
Accepting that it is possible that shareholders may have the incentives described in the last section, there still remain major obstacles to activism. These are not direct but rather in the nature of conflicts of interest. I consider them here before returning to the main theme in the next section. They may arise from several sources. However where an investor, on the basis of a meeting with a company's management, decided not to sell a holding, but to hold it in the hope of being able to influence the company to adopt a better strategy that would benefit it in the long run, that would hardly lead to an accusation of insider trading, even though it might be acting on inside information.
Fourth, the most serious obstacle to activism might be the possibility for other investors being able to free-ride off the efforts of the activist shareholder. Thus if fund managers were competing on similar performance indicators there would be perverse incentives because the ones who do nothing will perform better in the league tables than the one who intervenes. There would seem to be a simple remedy however in that the activist investor is in a position of being able to trade on the information it possesses: the information that it has obtained through its investment in the costs of activism and also that it is going to intervene with the company and the share price will benefit. Therefore it can gain by increasing its holding temporarily over its long term portfolio level and then sell the overweight portion when the company performance returns to normal. In absence of an agreement between investors the activist shareholder can recoup its additional costs by speculating on its own activism and need not lose out to free riders.
Such conflicts of interest as these are peripheral to the main issue of whether investors have private incentives to activism. I turn to this question in the next section.
A Model of the Incentives of an Activist Shareholder
I assume that the key issue in corporate governance is the accountability of the company's management for its overall performance. The model of an activist investor presented in this section maintains the assumption that an activist investor is concerned with company performance rather than some aspect of strategy such as executive pay which may be incidental to it.
An activist investor is assumed to be a financial institution that comprises essentially two funds: (1) the main portfolio and (2) A firm in the portfolio is assumed to generate a return on its shares at rate r, a random variable. The expected rate of return is µ and risk (measured by the standard deviation) is σ. In what follows I assume r to be normally distributed for convenience. The relevant measure of risk is firm-specific risk.
The Private Benefits of Intervention
The investor screens the performance of all shares in the main portfolio. However, if the performance of a company is exceptionally bad its shares are considered for transfer to the activism fund. 4 Suppose the investor has a policy of transferring the worstperforming 100α% of companies in its main portfolio to the activism fund; equivalently the probability of intervention in a company is α.
Let the threshold rate of return below which the company's shares are transferred to the activism fund be r α , defined by the condition, P(r < r α ) = α.
In the case where r is normally distributed, then
where Z is the standard normal deviate, and Z α such that Pr(Z < Z α ) = α.
Therefore the minimum expected return to intervention is equal to:
An investor holding a stake of £k of the shares of the company will expect to make an annual monetary return of Z α σ k whose estimated capital value based on an expected rate of return of µ, will be
The Costs of Activism
It is assumed that the total additional direct costs of intervening are equal to a sum of £A. These costs include the additional management costs of holding the shares in the activism fund, the costs of research into the particular circumstances of the company that would lead to poor performance and remedies, the costs associated with meetings between senior personnel and top managers of the company, and the costs associated with shareholder voting and co-ordinated shareholder action to change company policy or directors. A major part of the costs of activism arise from the necessity that to be successful it be led by senior high calibre personnel, who are able to formulate and implement the intervention strategy including being able to deal with top company managers on equal terms.
Given the level of cost, which is a one-off investment, then intervention is beneficial to the investor if it is less than the present value of the returns it brings, that is if,
Fiduciary Investors
The above analysis must be modified to allow for the case where the institution exercising control rights is different from the beneficial shareholder. Here the benefits to the fund manager reflect the level of the management fee paid in the form of an ad valorem commission on the value of the fund. Let the shareholding be £K and the rate of commission be c. Then the incentives which apply to the fund manager, and therefore are relevant to corporate governance, relate to a holding of cK rather than k, and this substitution must be made in (3) and (4) above. It is then possible to find the minimum shareholding which will be large enough that its manager would have a private incentive to activism.
Writing k = cK in (4) gives the condition
and therefore,
Expression (6) is the basis for the definition of a significant shareholding.
Definition: A Significant Shareholding
A significant shareholding is one sufficiently large that there is a private incentive to the investor controlling it to intervene to improve the performance of the company concerned.
A significant shareholding, K 0 , is the smallest value of K that satisfies inequality (6):
The cost of capital for the company, µ, is estimated using the capital asset pricing model, by the relationship: µ = r f + (r m -r f )β, where r f is the risk-free interest rate, r m is the return on the market portfolio (both common to all companies), and β is the company's systematic risk.
Significant Shareholdings in British Companies

The Data and Assumptions about Parameter Values
The model has been applied to two groups of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange at the end of December 1999: (1) the largest 250 and (2) rather than a precise estimate. I have taken a figure of £250,000 per year as the additional costs incurred by the investor, as a result of the company being the focus of activism, over the costs of its shares being in the main portfolio. I have assumed this figure to be independent of the size of company or the returns to activism. Experience suggests that it is typically necessary for a company to remain in the activist fund for a period of two years, in order for the changes required to restore it to normal profitability to be made and to have effect, although in some cases this period can be longer. Therefore I have used an estimate of A=£500,000 in the analysis, for all companies. This is of course, a gross oversimplification and it would be likely that these costs will increase with the size of the company -many of the costs associated with being active in the affairs of a large and complex company with many divisions might be expected far to exceed those for a smaller single product firm. Moreover the costs of taking coordinated shareholder action might be expected to vary according to circumstances depending on many factors. Assuming a constant value for A is therefore a first approximation and much further empirical research into this area is needed.
I have conducted three different analyses assuming different levels of commission.
The most important distinction here is between a shareholder who is an own-account investor, such as a private individual or a pension fund managed in-house, and a fiduciary fund manager who receives a fee in the form of commission. Legally this distinction is irrelevant because fiduciaries have a legal obligation to manage funds solely for the benefit of beneficiaries, so there should be no differences of behaviour. However the payment of In calculating the cost of capital, I have taken the risk-free rate, r f , equal to 5.5%, and the equity premium, r m -r f , of 4.5%. I have assumed the probability of a company being selected for the activism portfolio to be 1 percent, α = 0.01 (Z α = 2.3263); that is the investor is assumed to select the bottom-performing 1 percent of the companies in the main portfolio for activist intervention.
The Results
The distribution of the estimates of significant shareholdings, K 0 , obtained using expression (7) are shown in Table 1 . As is to be expected there is a very large difference between the results for own account shareholders and those for fiduciaries. For the former group virtually any shareholding is large enough to satisfy condition (6). In the Top 250 group a significant shareholding held by an own-account investor ranges between a minimum of £10,000 and a maximum of £470,000 with a median £80,000. In the Random Sample, it ranges around a median of £70,000 , between a minimum of £5,000 and a maximum of £430,000. and £34.7 million among the Random Sample. The range is between £7.9 million and £245.6 million among the Top 250. The minimum is £2.5 million in the Random Sample.
Higher levels of commission rates reduce the values of K 0 for both groups. Table 2 shows the distribution of the numbers of significant shareholdings per company, that is the number of holdings that are larger than K 0 . These results are useful in showing the number of shareholders in each firm who could be said to possess the incentives to shareholder activism, and therefore indicate the feasibility of improving company performance in this way through shareholder action.
The table also shows, for comparison, alternative numbers on different definitions of a significant shareholding that have been proposed in the literature. Charkham and Simpson (1999) proposed a slightly different definition of what they called 'significant ownership' from the one in this paper: in order to improve corporate governance, they proposed placing formal obligations on large shareholders to act as guardians of companies and for the purpose suggested such significant ownership might be 0.5% of the equity or, in the case of a very large company where there might be few such shareholders, as an alternative a cash sum of £25 million. I present results for both figures. A similar idea has been suggested by Sykes (2000) as part of his proposed programme for reform of corporate governance; one of his proposals is for institutional shareholders to be made "accountable for exercising their voting rights in an informed and sensible manner above some sensibly determined minimum holding (e.g. £10m)". I have taken this as the authority for an alternative definition of a significant shareholding, and presented numbers based on it also in Table 2 . Table 2 shows somewhat different results for the two groups of companies.
However, on the assumption that investors (c=1) all act on their own account, there are nearly always very many significant shareholders. Among the larger companies in the Top 250 group, every company has at least one significant shareholder, the lower quartile is 122, the median 165.5, and the maximum 955. In the Random Sample, the median is 44
and three quarters of companies have at least 24 significant shareholders. These figures suggest that most companies should have a substantial group of highly motivated shareholders.
Assuming investors are fiduciaries leads to different conclusions for the two groups Thus these results suggest that, for the market as a whole, a typical company is likely to have very few significant shareholders with the necessary incentives to activism.
This suggests the likelihood of a corporate governance failure due to financial institutions lacking incentives to activism among the smaller companies. Table 3 shows the percentage of the equity held by investors with significant holdings. For own account investors, these figures are nearly always very large suggesting the potential for voting control exists in the great majority of companies. For the other definitions, however, the results are, as before, different for large and smaller companies.
For c=19bp, in the Top 250 group, the median is 40.2%, and the lower quartile is 28%, suggesting that most companies in this group could be controlled by a bloc of financial institutions, with the right incentives, acting together. In the Random Sample there is an absence of significant shareholdings on the definitions I have used; again, the figures for the £25M definition correspond fairly closely to those for c=30bp. The 0.5% group suggest there is no lack of significant shareholders.
Conclusion
The argument often advanced against basing a policy of improving standards of corporate governance on shareholder activism, that there is a pervasive lack of incentives in a market based system such as Britain, has been shown to be untrue. What is important is whether the likely returns to activism exceed the necessary costs incurred by the shareholder activists, a question that has not previously received much attention from A model of the incentives faced by an activist investor has been proposed which provides a measure of the minimum expected returns to activism to compare with the associated costs. The model is based on the assumption that a company in the investor's main portfolio produces a return which is a random variable against whose distribution under-performance can be identified. The minimum expected returns to activism are defined using this distribution: activism is assumed to restore the company's performance to the expected rate of return and this provides the required measure.
The model has been applied to two samples of British companies, the largest 250 and a random sample of all listed companies, and for both own-account investors and fiduciary fund managers paid commission, assumed to be motivated solely by self interest.
The results, which should be interpreted as representative orders of magnitude rather than exact estimates, indicate that, for fund managers, among the largest companies shareholder incentives to activism are powerful, while among the smaller companies they are mixed.
The question of incentives should be seen as an empirical question with a lot of variation between companies. For the own-account investors incentives appear to be pervasive.
The approach used here is very preliminary and approximate, the results should be considered as no more than indicative of orders of magnitude and suggestive of directions for future research. In particular, the model of an activist shareholder is extremely stylised, the intention being to abstract from many real-world factors in order to focus on the pure private incentives. The model ignores conflicts of interest that affect many financial institutions to a substantial degree. It oversimplifies the nature of corporate governance activism by making the unreal assumption that it is always possible for a shareholder to turn round an underperforming company by making suitable changes in strategy or senior
personnel, yet in practice a company's underperformance may be for deeper, fundamentally intractable reasons. It sidesteps the whole question of voting power, which has been dealt with elsewhere; this would be justified if voting, and the formation of voting coalitions for control, were costless, since in determining incentives it would only be necessary to consider the shareholders' ideal points, and it would be irrelevant if they had a controlling holding or not. In practice, however, part of the cost of activism must be seen as due to the need to coordinate the votes of diverse shareholders. The assumptions made more generally about the costs of activism are extremely simplistic and crude, and further research is needed.
